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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MASSACHUSETTS STATurE IMPOSING
A DIFFERENT PENALTY FOR JURY CONVICTIONS UPHELD AS NOT
VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PRoTECTION-Common

wealth v. LeRoy, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2376, 380 N.E. 2d 128.
At a de novo trial before a jury of six, 1 Frederick LeRoy was
convicted under a Massachusetts statute of operating a motor vehi
cle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 2 Section 24
provides that upon a "conviction" for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the defendant's
driver's license is to be revoked for one year. 3 LeRoy sought to
avoid losing his license after the jury returned its verdict by mov
ing for an alternative disposition pursuant to section 24E. Under
this statute, the case is continued without finding, no "conviction"
1. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 218, § 27A (West Supp. 1978).
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (West Supp. 1978).
The statute provides:
(I)(a) Whoever, upon any way or in any place to which the public has a
right of access, or upon any way or in any place to which members of the
public have access as invitees or licensees, operates a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... shall be punished by a fine of
not less than thirty-five nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprison
ment for not less than two weeks nor more than two years, or both such fine
and imprisonment....
(b) A conviction of-a violation of the preceding paragraph of this section
shall be reported forthwith by the court or magistrate to the registrar, who
shall revoke immediately the license or the right to operate ~f the person so
convicted, and no appeal, motion for new trial or exceptions shall operate to
stay the revocation of the license or right to operate.
(c) The registrar, after having revoked the license or the right to operate
of any person under the preceding paragraph of this section, shall not issue
a new license or reinstate the right to operate to such person, except in his
discretion if the prosecution of such person has terminated in favor of the
defendant ... until one year after the date of revocation following a convic
tion of any violation of said paragraph....
(d) For the purposes of subdivision (I) of this section, a person shall be
deemed to have been convicted if he pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or
was found or adjudged guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction, whether
or not he was placed on probation without sentence or under a suspended
sentence or the case was placed on file, and a license may be revoked under
paragraph (b) hereof notwithstanding the pendency of a prosecution upon
appeal or otherwise after such a conviction. Where there has been more than
one conviction in the same prosecution, the date of the first conviction shall
be deemed to be the date of conviction under paragraph (c) hereof.

[d.
3.

[d. § 24(1)(c).
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is recorded, and the defendant's driver's license is not revoked. 4
The district court judge denied- this motion and stated that because
of the jury verdict of guilty, he had no authority to continue the
case without a finding under section 24E. 5 The judge noted, how
ever, that he would allow the motion if it were a jury waived pro
ceeding. s
On appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 7
LeRoy contended that the district court judge had the authority to
continue the case without a finding under section 24E for persons
convicted by a jury of driving while intoxicated. He argued that a
plain reading of section 24 indicates that a jury verdict does not
necessarily constitute a "conviction" that would automatically man
4.

The statute provides:
The provisions of section 24D and this section shall apply to persons
convicted or charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influ
ence of intoxicating liquor. The provisions of this section shall not apply
where notice from the registrar of intention to suspend or revoke a person's
license or right to operate is pending prior to the date of complaint on the
offense before the court nor to cases, where under paragraph (c) of subdivi
sion (1) of section twenty-four, the violation is determined to have caused a
death.
In order to qualify for a disposition under this section such person shall,
in the judgment of the court, have cooperated fully with the investigation as
described in section twenty-four D and shall be and have been in full com
pliance with such order as the court may have made for a one year term of
probation as provided therein, including participation in such driver alcohol
education programs, alcohol treatment or alcohol treatment and rehabilita
tion programs as the court may have ordered.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the exercise by a
court of its authority under law to make any other disposition of a case of
operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Where a person has been charged with operating a motor vehicle under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, and where the case has been continued
without a finding and such person has been placed on probation with his
consent and where such person is qualified for disposition under this sec
tion, a hearing shall be held by the court at any time after sixty days but not
later than ninety days from the date where the case has been continued
without a finding to review such person's compliance with the program or
dered as a condition of probation and to determine whether dismissal of the
charge is warranted.

Where an order of probation has been revoked by the court, the court
shall forthwith so notify the registrar in writing and the registrar shall forth
with revoke said person's operators license or right to operate which was re
stored under this section and without further hearing.
ld. § 24E (West Supp. 1978).
5. Commonwealth v. LeRoy, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2376, 2377, 380 N.E.2d 128,
129.
6. Brief for Appellant at 3.
7. Commonwealth v. LeRoy, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2376, 380 N.E. 2d 128.
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date disposition under that section to the exclusion of an
alternative disposition under section 24E. 8 He further argued that
if the judge lacked the authority to order section 24E disposition,
then the statutory scheme as set forth in sections 24 and 24E
denied a defendant the equal protection of the law and infringed
on his right to trial by jury.9 LeRoy maintained that revocation of
one's driver's license imposed a greater penalty on defendants tried
by a jury than that imposed on defendants tried by a judge and
thus constituted an impermissible infringement on the right to trial
by jury. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the dis
trict court judge's interpretation of his authority under sections 24
and 24E and rejected the constitutional violations alleged in Com
monwealth v. LeRoy.l0
I.

BACKGROUND

Sections 24, 24D, and 24E establish a statutory scheme for the
adjudication and sentencing of persons charged with the crime of
driving while intoxicated. Although interrelated, each section was
enacted at a different time and with a different legislative purpose.
Attempting to accomodate various policy considerations,11 the leg
islature added sections 24D and 24E to the original section
8. See note 2 supra. Before a defendant's license is revoked pursuant to section
24(I)(b), the defendant must be "convicted" of driving while intoxicated. The statute
defines the word "conviction" in section 24(1)(d) as constituting a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere or an adjudication of guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
definition does not specifically mention a jury verdict as constituting a "conviction".
The defendant argued that the judge, in his discretion, could choose not to adjudge
the defendant guilty by withholding entry of the jury verdict of guilt into the court
records. Instea~, the judge'could continue the case without a finding and require the
defendant to enter the driver alcohol edncation program pursuant to section 24E. If
the defendant violated the terms and conditions of the program, the judge could then
enter the verdict of guilty and sentence the defendant pursuant to section 24(1)(a). If
the defendant successfully completed the program then the judge could dismiss the
case and the jury verdict would not be entered into the defendant's criminal record.
Brief for Appellant at 5-7.
9. Brieffor Appellant at 11.
10. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2376, 380 N.E. 2d 128. The constitutional challenge
presented in LeRoy has resurfaced recently in federal court. In March, 1979, U.S.
District Court Judge Walter Jay Skinner allowed a "Temporary Restraining Order"
prohibiting Norfolk County District Attorney William Delahunt from prosecuting a
man, accused of driving while intoxicated, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (West
Supp. 1978), in the six man jury session in the Wrentham District Court. The defen
dant, Alan R. Gronroos, Jr., claims the same constitutional infringement as claimed in
LeRoy. In granting the injunctive relief, Judge Skinner noted "that the plaintiff has a
likelihood of success on the merits." Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, April 2, 1979,
at 1, col. 1. A hearing on the merits ofthe case is now pending. Id.
U. See text accompanying notes 18-19 and 26-27 infra.
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defining the crime of driving while intoxicated. The LeRoy decision
represents the first judicial interpretation of the scope and content
of these additions in the context of a constitutional challenge.
Section 24 defines the elements of the crime of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and
provides for the punishment of persons convicted of the offense. 12
For the purposes of section 24, the term "conviction" is defined in
the following language:
[AJ person shall be deemed to have been convicted if he pleaded
guilty or nolo contendere or was found or adjudged guilty by a
court of competent jurisdiction, whether or not he was placed on
probation without sentence or under a suspended sentence or
the case was placed on file .... 13

Included within the terms of the statute is the provision requiring
the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to revoke the license for one year
of any person convicted of the crime. 14 The statute also establishes
a maximum penalty of $1,000, or imprisonment for two years, or
both. 1S These severe penalties are presumably intended for the
purpose of punishment and deterrence in an area of legitimate
public concern. 16
Section 24D establishes a program of driver alcohol education
for persons convicted of or charged with the offense of driving
while intoxicated. 17 The legislative intent in enacting section 24D
was to provide assistance and counseling for those persons suffering
from alcohol abuse who are arrested for drunk driving. 18 This pro
12.

See note 2 supra.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Approximately fifty percent of the estimated fifty thousand annual motor ve
hicle accident deaths are caused by drunk drivers. For an extensive survey of these
statistics and the correlation between alcohol and driving fatalities see UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF TRANSP., 90th CONG., 2d SESS., ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY
REpORT (Comm. Print 1968).
17. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Any person convicted of or charged with operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor may, if he consents, be
placed on probation for one year and shall, as a condition of probation, be
assigned to a driver alcohol education program as provided herein and, if
deemed necessary by the court, to an alcohol treatment or rehabilitation pro
gram or to both as provided herein. Such order of probation shall be in addi
tion to any penalties imposed ... as a condition for any suspension of sen
tence.
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24D (West Supp. 1978).
18. See SPECIAL COMMISSION PROVIDING FOR AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY
RELATIVE TO THE PENALTY FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICAT
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gram identifies potential or actual alcoholics and offers them reha
bilitation treatment rather than punishment. 19 The legislation cre
ates a driver alcohol education program as a condition of probation
for a defendant who needs professional counseling for an alcohol
related offense. 20
Section 24E2I provides an alternative to the mandatory license
revocation provision of section 24. 22 Under this section, the court
is empowered to continue the case without a finding and to assign
the defendant to the driver alcohol education program as estab
lished by section 24D.23 If the case is continued without a finding,
then no "conviction" is reported to the Registrar and the defen
dant's operator's license is not revoked. 24 If the defendant, however,
fails to abide by the terms of the driver alcohol education program,
the court is required to notify the Registrar. When the Registrar
receives this notification, the Registrar must revoke the defendant's
license for one year. 25
Section 24E is intended to provide the appropriate incentive
to offenders to enter and successfully complete the driver alcohol
education program under section 24D.26 The section is also de
signed to alleviate the hardship imposed on those first time offend
ers who must have their driver's license to conduct their trade,
business or employment. 27 These goals are served by providing an
alternative sentence and procedure to the mandatory license revo
cation provision of section 24.28

II. THE LERoy CASE
The LeRoy decision mandates that when a jury convicts a de
fendant of driving while intoxicated, the defendant must be senING LIQUOR, REpORT, MASS. H.R. REP. No. 6163, 168 GEN. COURT, 2d SESS. (1974)
[hereinafter cited as SPECIAL COMMISSION]. See also Note, The Chronic Alcoholic:
Treatment v. Punishment, 3 SUFFOLK L. REV. 406 (1969).
19. See J. FIELDING & E. BLACKER, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
GENERAL COURT ON THE DRIVER ALCOHOL EDUCATION PROGRAM (June 1978) (pre
pared by the Mass. Dept. of Pub. Health, Div. of Alcoholism).
20. This legislation is motivated partly by a realization that the traditional ap
proach to the problem is ineffective. See note 19 supra at 11.
21. 1975 Mass. Acts ch. 505, § 2.
22. See 32 J. NOLAN, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 557, at 367-68 (1976).

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

[d.
See
See
See
See

note 19 supra at 5.
note 4 supra.
SPECIAL COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 7.
Mass. S. 588, 168 Gen. Court, 2nd Sess. (1974). See also Mass. H.R.
Res. 5563, 168 Gen. Court, 2nd Sess. (1974).
28. See Mass. H.R. 4927, Mass. H.R. 4923, Mass. H.R. 4739, Mass. RR. 4124, &
Mass. H.R. 3966, 168 Gen. Court, 2nd Sess. (1974).
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tenced according to section 24. It precludes an alternative disposi
tion under section 24E. LeRoy challenged the trial court's
interpretation of the inapplicability of section 24E as an erroneous
reading of the statutory language and legislative intent. 29 More
over, LeRoy contended that the trial court's interpretation in
fringed on his federal and state constitutional right to a trial by
jury3° and denied him equal protection. 31 The Massachusetts Su
preme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court decision and rejected
LeRoy's allegations of constitutjonal infirmity.
In challenging the trial court's construction of sections 24 and
24E, LeRoy adopted a literal meaning approach to statutory inter
pretation. 32 He argued that a jury verdict of guilty did not neces
sarily satisfy the definition of "conviction" under section 24, and,
therefore, it did not require section 24 disposition as opposed to
section 24E disposition. 33 Since the language of section 24(1)(d)
reads "adjudged guilty by a Court of competent jurisdiction ... ,"
LeRoy maintained that the court may elect not to enter the jury
finding of guilt and continue the case without a finding pursuant
to section 24E without violating the language of section 24.34
The LeRoy court interpreted "conviction," as defined in section
24(l)(d), to include a jury verdict returned against the accused, al
though the language of that section does not specifically so read. 35
29. Brief for Appellant at 5.
30. Defendant relied on the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution
as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con
stitution and on Part 1, Article XII of the Massachusetts Constitution which guaran
tee the right to trial by jury. Brieffor Appellant at 10-11.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. The plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation was formulated in United
States v. Missouri Pac. RR, 278 U.S. 269 (1929) wherein the Court observed,
"where the language of an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms
does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed are to
be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended." Id. at 278. For a critique
of the plain meaning rule see Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning
Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modem" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1299 (1975). A discussion of various other approaches to statutory interpretation
appears in Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1 (1954).
33. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.

Id.
35. See note 2 supra. The court defines "conviction" as the "confession of the
accused in open court, or the verdict returned against him by the jury, which ascer
tains and publishes ... guilt." 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2378 n.l, 380 N.E.2d at 129
n.l (quoting from Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323, 325 (1872)) (addi
tional citations omitted). The court compared this language with the statutory lan
guage contained in section 24(1)(d) and found the two were substantially in accord.
34.
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Thus, the court decided that a defendant tried by a jury is subject
to the provision of section 24 which would automatically revoke his
license, while a defendant tried by a judge may keep his license
under section 24E disposition. The court concluded that LeRoy's
proposed construction was a major policy change which must be
addressed to the legislature. 36
The court next considered the alleged constitutional violations
arising from its interpretation of the statute. Relying upon the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, LeRoy ar
gued that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between
those persons who are tried by a jury and, therefore, deemed ineli
gible for alternative disposition under section 24E, and those per
sons who are tried by a judge ar.d deemed eligible for the al
ternative disposition. 37 In rejecting this equal protection challenge,
the court reasoned that there is no constitutional right that
alternative dispOSition be available to all. 38 Furthermore, the court
stated that the statute did not create an invidious classification
merely because a more severe sentence might be accorded to those
persons who exercise their right to trial by jury.39 Therefore, equal
protection did not require a construction of sections 24 and 24E
different from the construction given by the court. 40
Although the court summarily disposed of the equal protection
issue, it gave greater attention to the allegation that the statute in
fringed on the right to trial by jury.41 LeRoy stressed that if sec
tion 24E disposition is available only for those persons tried by a
judge, the statute inhibited the assertion of his right to trial by
jury.42 Referring to decisions which have upheld the practice of

The iegisiature may, of course, define the terms of the statute as it sees fit. 'fhe iegai
meaning of the word "conviction," however, has not always had this characterization.
For the purposes of affecting a witness's credibility, the word "conviction" is de
fined as "a final judgment and sentence of the court conclusively establishing ...
guilt ... [And] merely showing a verdict of guilty or placing a defendant on proba
tion does not satisfy the statute." Commonwealth v. Hersey, 324 Mass. 196, 205, 85
N.E.2d 447, 453 (1949) (citing MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (West 1959».
36. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2381,380 N.E.2d at 131.
37. Brieffor Appellant at 11.
38. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2379, 380 N.E.2d at 130. See Healey v. First Dist.
Court of Bristol, 367 Mass. 909,327 N.E.2d 894 (1975).
39. Id. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 722-23 (1969). See also
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
40. For an analysis of equal protection under the circumstances of LeRoy see
note 129 infra and accompanying text.
41. See note 30 supra.
42. Brief for Appellant at 6.
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plea bargaining, the court analogized plea bargaining with the stat
utory scheme under sections 24 and 24E. 43 The court observed:
"The possibility that a greater penalty will result from a jury trial
than from entry of a guilty plea has not been found to infringe
impermissibly on the right to a jury trial."44 In addition, the court
reasoned: "Not all government imposed choices in the criminal
process which discourage the exercise of rights are impermissi
ble. "45 The court concluded that the choice imposed on defendants
charged with drunk driving falls within the realm of allowable gov
ernmental conduct.

III.

ANALYSIS

A.

Statutory Construction
In its construction of sections 24 and 24E, the LeRoy court
made no reference to the first sentence of section 24E. That sen
tence creates ambiguity about the scope of section 24E. The sec
tion begins by stating, "The provisions of section 24D and this sec
tion shall apply to persons convicted or charged with operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. "46
The remainder of the section then states, "Where a person has
been charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influ
ence . . . and where the case has been continued without a find
ing. . . ," the person may be placed on probation for one year and
shall participate in the driver alcohol education program as set
forth in section 24D.47 Apparently, section 24E applies to persons
convicted of the offense, yet a "continuance without a finding" is
!raditionally granted before conViction. 48 Therefore, section 24E is
43. The court did not explicitly make reference to plea bargaining in its deci
sion. The cases which the court cited and the principles upon which those cases
relied deal, however, with situations in which plea bargaining· is an issue. See 1978
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 238Q,~80 N.E.2d at 1~0 (cJting.Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, rehearing denied, 435 U.S. 918
(1978); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)).
44. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2380, 380 N.E.2d at 130. See Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). See also
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, rehearing denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978); Com
monwealth v. Simpson, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 991-92, 345 N.E.2d 899.
45. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2380, 380 N.E.2d at 130. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,
412 U.S. 17, 29-35 (1973). See Gavin v. Commonwealth, 367 Mass. 331, 327 N.E.2d
707 (1975); Mann v. Commonwealth, 359 Mass. 661, 271 N.E.2d 331 (1971); Walsh v.
Commonwealth, 358 Mass. 193, 260 N.E.2d 911 (1970).
46. See note 4 supra. (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. There is no statutory authority for the judicial practice of a "continuance
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ambiguous as to its applicability to convicted offenders.
The court overlooked this ambiguity and held that a continu
ance without a finding could not be granted after a jury convic
tion. 49 Referring to the paragraph of section 24E which empowers
the court to continue the case without a finding, the court noted
that only the word "charged" immediately precedes the language
providing for the continuance. Thus, the court reasoned that only
those defendants who are charged but not convicted could have
their case continued without a finding under section 24E. The ef
fect of the court's reasoning is that the section 24E alternative dis
position is limited to defendants who choose a jury-waived pro
ceeding. 50
In iI!terpreting section 24E, the LeRoy court takes too narrow
a view of the scope of the word "charged". The fact that the fourth
paragraph of section 24E uses the word "charged" and does not
read "or convicted" does not preclude application of section 24E to
convicted offenders. Any person convicted of drunk driving must
first have been "charged" with the offense. The word "charged"
merely refers to a condition which must occur before other judicial
procedures follow. Those procedures may culminate in an admis
sion, a jury-waived procedure, or a proceeding where the defend
ant decides to be tried by a jury. Thus, the word "charged," in the
context of the statute, does not compel a finding that section 24E is
limited to admissions or jury-waived trials.
In light of the statutory ambiguity,51 doubt is cast on the
without a finding." 30 K. SMITH, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 728, at 350 (1976).
The practice has been upheld as constitutional provided the judge records his find
ings of fact and the reasons for the continuance. Commonwealth v. Brandano, 359
Mass. 332, 337, 269 N.E.2d 84, 88 (1971). The continuance is usually granted upon a
plea of not guilty and before trial but the court may insist on a plea of guilty before
granting the continuance. 30 K. Smith, supra at 351. If a case is continued without a
finding then the court may dismiss it after some time. [d. at 350. The usual condition
for granting the continuance is that the person charged with a crime be placed on
probation on such terms as the court deems proper. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
276, § 87 (West Supp. 1979). See also 30 K. Smith, supra § 728, at 254 (Supp. 1978).
49. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2379, 380 N.E.2d at 131.
50. Where a defendant chooses to admit to the charge or elects a jury-waived
trial, the judge, in his discretion, can opt to continue the case without a finding be
fore pronouncing the defendant guilty. Typically, the court will find sufficient facts
for a finding of guilty and continue the case on that basis. Technically, the defendant
has not been convicted because the court has not declared the defendant guilty.
Thus, the defendant is still only charged with the offense and not yet formally con
victed. This procedure has been limited to jury-waived proceedings because the
judge is both the trier of fact and the sentencing authority in such proceedings. Ob
servations of the author in Springfield District Court, Springfield, Massachusetts.
51. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
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court's determination that alternative disposition under section 24E
is unavailable to those defendants convicted by a jury of driving
while intoxicated. Where statutory language is unclear, resort to
legislative history is necessary to ascertain legislative intent. 52 An
inquiry into the legislative history of section 24E contains little evi
dence of an intent to exclude persons convicted by a jury from its
coverage.
The alternative sentencing scheme of section 24E originated
pursuant to the recommendations of a special commission. 53 This
commission was established to investigate and study two problems
of legislative concern. First, the commission considered the estab
lishment of a driver retraining and alcohol rehabilitation program. 54
Second, the commission considered legislation which would allow
for early reinstatement of the driver's license for persons convicted
of driving while intoxicated. 55 The commission's report led to the
enactment of sections 24D and 24E in July, 1974. 56 This Act repre
sented the first version of t.~e two sections.
Under the 1974 version of sections 24D and 24E, persons con
victed of driving while intoxicated could obtain early reinstatement
of driving privileges if they sucessfully completed. the driver alco
hol education program. 57 Significantly, the provisions of this statute
applied whether conviction was obtained with or without a jury.
The statute, however, made no provision for the person whose case
had been continued without a finding to enter the driver alcohol
education program. In addition, the statute still required the revo
cation of one's driver's license for a period of at least sixty days. 58
52. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499 (1962); United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940). See also Jones, The Plain Meaning
Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q.
2, 10-11 (1939).
53. The Special Commission was established by virtue of 1973 Mass. Resolves
ch. 130. In May of 1974, the Special Commission made its report to the House of
Representatives recommending the establishment of a driver alcohol education pro
gram and the enactment of legislation to provide for early, conditional reinstatement
of the driving privilege for persons convicted of driving while intoxicated. SPECIAL
COMMISSION supra note 18. In June of 1974, the Special Commission was charged
with the additional responsibility of considering 13 Senate and House documents
which called for legislation to alleviate the hardship imposed on first time offenders
who lose their license as a result of a conviction of driving while intoxicated. 1974
Mass. Resolves ch. 47.
54. 1973 Mass. Resolves ch. 130.
55.
56.
57.
58.

ld.
1974 Mass. Acts ch. 647.
Id.
ld.
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Subsequent legislation was introduced to expand the class of per
sons eligible for the driver alcohol education program and to fur
ther amend the loss of license provision by allowing the defendant
to retain his license subject to the discretion of the court. 59
In June 1975, it new draft of sections 24D and 24E was pro
posed. 60 This second version of sections 24D and 24E covered
those persons "convicted or charged" with the offense of driving
while intoxicated. 61 Initially, the draft merely added a provision for
the inclusion of those persons whose case had been continued
without a finding. 62 Later, however, the proposed bill was again
amended, and it eliminated those phrases which provided for early
reinstatement of an operator's license after conviction. 63 This final
version was enacted,64 and it represents the current sections 24D
and24E.65
The deletion of the language providing for early reinstatement
of a driver's license after conviction causes some confusion over the
application of section 24E to convict~d offenders. The elimination
of this language and the inclusion of the provision allowing for the
continuance without a finding served the express legislative pur
pose of permitting defendants to enter the driver alcohol education
program without suffering even temporary loss of license. 66 The
elimination of this language, however, also raises the issue of
59. Mass. S. 984, 169 Gen. Court, 1st Sess. (1975).
60. Mass. H.R. 6365, 169 Gen. Court, 1st Sess. (1975). This bill was reported fa
vorably by the Committee on the Judiciary. [1975] 2 Mass. J.H.R. 2222.
61. Id.
62. Compare Mass. H.R. 6365, 169 Gen. Court, 1st Sess. (1975) with 1974
Mass. Acts ch. 647. H.R. 6365 states:
Where a person has been placed on probation and is qualified for dispo
sition under this section and revocation of a license or right to operate has
taken effect for the conviction of operating under the influence of intoxicat
ing liquor or where the case has been continued without a finding, a hear
ing shall be held by the court at any time after sixty days but not later than
ninety days from the date of said revocation or where the case has been con
tinued without a finding to review such person's compliance with the pro
gram ordered as a condition of probation and to determine whether early
reinstatement of said operator's license, or right to operate or dismissal of
the charge is warranted.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. Mass. H.R. 6412, 169 Gen. Court 1st Sess. (1975). This new draft eliminated
the language of H.R. 6365 which referred to "revocation of a license... for the con
viction of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . to determine
whether early reinstatement of said operator's license...." Id. See note 62 supra.
64. 1975 Mass. Acts ch. 505.
.
65. See notes 4 and 17 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 55 and 59 supra.
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whether persons convicted of the offense would be eligible for sec
tion 24E disposition. The problem arises because a continuance
without a finding is traditionally granted before a conviction in a
jury-waived proceeding. 67
The LeRoy court resolved the issue of the scope of section 24E
by adhering to the traditional use of a continuance without a find
ing and interpreting section 24E accordingly. Yet the legislative
history demonstrates that the exclusive purpose in enacting section
24E was to mollify the harshness of the mandatory license revo
cation provision of section 24. The first version of section 24E
achieved this end without discriminating between jury and jury
waived proceedings. 68 The second version of section 24E retained
the language of the first version in stating that its provisions ap
plied to persons "convicted or charged".69 This latter version dif
fered from its predecessor only insofar as it deleted the rein
statement of license provision and included the provision allowing
for a continuance without a finding .. The change in language is ex
plainable solely in terms of the express legislative intent,70 and to
imply a further deviation from the policy of the first verson is
speculative. Like the first version, the second version of section
24E was intended to apply to defendants at any stage of the judi
cial proceeding with the court retaining the discretion to determine
whether the defendant is an appropriate subject for such disposi
tion.71 By permitting a continuance without a finding after convic
tion by a jury, the defendant is still required to attend the driver
alcohol education program but is not required to relinquish his li
cense. Under these circumstances, the legislative intent is ful

67. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
68. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
69. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
70. The language providing for reinstatement of license after conviction was no
longer needed because a continuance without a finding results in the license not be
ing revoked in the first instance. This specific change in language further mitigates
the harshness of the mandatory license revocation provision of section 24(1)(b) and
thus comports with the express legislative intent in amending the first version of sec
tion 24E.
71. Letter received from Representative Paul White dated November 14, 1978
(on file with Western New England Law Review). At the time of the enactment of
section 24E, Mr. White sponsored the legislation which resulted in its enactment. In
his letter, Mr. White states that it was the legislative intent that the judge be given
broad latitude in determining who would be an appropriate subject for section 24E
disposition. More important, it was also the legislative intent that section 24E dispo
sition would be available at any stage of the judicial proceeding. ld.
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filled. 72 The LeRoy decision thwarts the full realization of that in
tent by restricting the scope and application of section 24E.73

B.

Constitutional Questions

The central constitutional issue considered in LeRoy is
whether a greater penalty could be imposed on the defendant
solely because he chose to exercise his sixth amendment right to
trial by jury. The LeRoy court held that neither due process nor
equal protection precludes imposing a harsher sentence for those
persons tried by a jury than those persons tried by a judge. The
court, however, fails to note that due process prohibits the pursuit
of legitimate state objectives at the expense of an unnecessary in
fringement of basic constitutional rights. 74 Furthermore, the court
gives insufficient attention to the question of whether due process
is violated when the result of the state action is to deter the exer
cise of cons'titutional rights. 75
Application of due process analysis to LeRoy requires the reso
lution of two threshhold questions: (1) Whether revocation of one's
license is "punishment" for the purpose of due process;76 and (2)
whether the crime of driving while intoxicated is a serious offense
for the purpose of a federal constitutional right to trial by jury. If
either of these two questions was answered negatively, LeRoy
could not complain of an infringement of his right to trial by jury
either because no greater "punishment" is being imposed after a
jury conviction or because he has no federal constitutional right to
trial by jury in the first instance. Though there exists some author
ity to the contrary,77 the majority position considers revocation of a
driver's license as constituting "punishment" for the purpose of due
72. That intent, as expressed by the Special Commission report, is to avoid the
hardship imposed on first time offenders who are unable to drive as a result of a con
viction for drunk driving. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
73. In restricting section 24E disposition to those persons tried by a judge and
disallowing its application to those persons tried by a jury, an entire class of defend
ants are excluded from the benefits of the legislation. As a consequence, a first time
offender of the drunk driving law must relinquish a constitutional right to obtain the
benefit of a statutory enactment. The full utility of section 24E is thereby weakened.
74. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
75. See text accompanying notes 98-127 infra.
76. The issue may focus on whether revocation of a drivers license is the depri
vation of a right or a privilege. In either case, a punishment is imposed regardless of
whether the interest be deemed a right or a privilege. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971).
77. Smith v. State, 17 Md. App. 217, 301 A.2d 54 (1973).
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process protection. 78 Aside from this judicial pronouncement, de
fendants consider license revocation as the most severe of all possi
ble punishment for the offense excluding actual incarceration. 79
With respect to the defendant's sixth amendment right of trial by
jury, the right applies only to those offenses punishable by a maxi
mum tenn of at least sixth months in prison and a $500 fine. 80
Since the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influ
ence of intoxicating liquor is punishable by a maximum tenn of at
least two years in prison and a $1,000 fine,81 the offense qualifies
as one for which a federal constitutional right to trial by jury atta
ches. Consequently, the contention that the LeRoy court's inter
pretation of section 24 and 24E violates due process does ·not fail
because of preliminary considerations.
The United States Supreme Court has held that due process
violations arise when a statutory scheme needlessly deters the ex
ercise of a constitutional right. 82 In a decision not discussed by the
LeRoy court, the Supreme Court set forth a standard of judicial re
view for an alternative sentencing scheme. In United States v.
Jackson,83 the Court considered the section of the Federal Kidnap
ping Act84 which provided that the death penalty could be imposed
only upon a jury verdict. 85 In that case, the defendant contended
that this greater penalty was only possible if he elected to go to
trial. The threat of greater penalty, therefore, discouraged the ex
ercise of his sixth amendment right. The Court agreed and invali
dated the greater penalty provision by stating: "Whatever might be
78. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Rothweiler v. Superior Court of Pima
County, 100 Ariz. 37,410 P.2d 479 (1966).
79. Little, A Theory and Empirical Study of What Deters Drinking Drivers, If,
When and Why, 23 AD. L. REv. 23, 51 (1971).
80. Sixth amendment right to trial by jury applies in criminal cases only to "se
rious" offenses and the maximum sentence imposed by statute is controlling. Dun
can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In contrast, "petty" offenses not subject to trial
by jury are those punishable by a maximum term of six months in prison and a $500
fine. Id. at 161.
81. Under section 24(I)(a) a person convicted thereunder is subject to a maxi
mum penalty of not more than one thousand do lIars or by imprisonment for not more
than two years or both. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(a) (West Supp. 1978).
See note 2 supra.
82. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).

83.
84.
85.
exercise
than the
570, 576

ld.
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976).
The legislative purpose in enacting the provision was not to discourage the
of the right to trial by jury. The intent was merely to make the jury rather
judge the arbiter of the death sentence. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
(1968).
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said of Congress' objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that
needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights. . . . The
question is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather
than intentional; the question is whether the effect is unnecessary
and therefore excessive."88 Although the defendant in LeRoy is
faced with losing his license rather than losing his life, the same
underlying principle promulgated in Jackson applies in reference to
the application of section 24E. If section 24E is not intended to
discourage the exercise of the right to trial by jury,87 any resulting
discouragement of the right to trial by jury from the operation of
the statute is unnecessary and therefore excessive. Moreover,
alternative methods are available to achieve the statute's objectives
without needlessly chilling the exercise of a basic constitutional
right. In the Jackson Court's view, the availability of alternatives is
decisive. 88
An alternative suggested by the defendant in LeRoy meets the
objective of section 24E89 without infringing on the defendant's
right to trial by jury.90 By allowing the court to continue the case
without a finding after a verdict of guilty, the defendant's license is
not revoked and a greater penalty is not necessarily imposed as a
result of the exercise of a constitutional right. If, however, the de
fendant violates the terms of his probation as set forth under sec
tion 24E then his license is revoked and the court may enter its
finding. This procedure channels offenders into the driver alcohol
education program and provides an incentive for them to success
fully participate in the program. At the same time, it protects the
state's interest in rehabilitating or punishing violators of the drunk
driving law. 91
86. Id. at 582. The view adopted in Jackson is not without legal precedent. See
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965);
Malloy· v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Nor is this view without its supporters in the
field of legal commentary. See Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in
the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-25 (1970).
87. It is argued that the legislative intent in enacting section 24E was not to
discourage the exercise of the right to trial by jury. See text accompanying notes
53-73 supra.
88. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1968).
89. First time offenders are channeled into the alcohol educational program
without even temporary loss of license. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 130 and 131 infra.
91. The defendant subject to section 24E disposition is required to attend the
driver alcohol education program as established by section 24D. See note 4 supra. As
established, the program consists of at least eight two hour sessions where .attend
ance is mandatory. See MASS. COMM'R OF PROBATION, GUIDELINES FOR DRIVER
ALCOHOL EDUCATION PROGRAM 10 (1975). Eligibility requirements include a $200
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A statute similar to the alternative the defendant is suggesting
already exists on the federal level. 92 Under federal law, a person
convicted for the first time for possession of a controlled substance
may be placed on probation and have his case continued without a
finding. 93 The court is empowered to dismiss the charge if the de
fendant successfully completes his probationary terms. 94 Signifi
cantly, the statute applies at any stage of the judicial proceeding,
including adjudication after a jury verdict of guilt. 95 As such, the
statute exacts no price for a person's insistence on a trial.
The LeRoy court had the option of requiring an alternative
other than that offered by the defendant. It could have declared
the current statutory scheme unconstitutional as an unnecessary in
fringement on the right to trial by jury.96 The legislature would
then be obligated to adopt more appropriate means to achieve its
objectives. Under one proposed alternative,97 a person convicted of
drunk driving would be subject to the penalties as provided by
law. The defendant's driver's license, however, need not be re
voked if he consents to participate in the driver alcohol education
program. This provision would apply regardless of the manner in
which the conviction was obtained. Consequently, this proposed
legislation would not require the court to continue the case without
a finding to invoke the license saving provision. The advantage of
such a proposal is that neither the interests of the state nor the in
terests of the individual are jeopardized.
The foregoing constitutional analysis is premised on the deterfee which can only be avoided upon a showing of indigency. MASS GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 90, § 24D (West Supp. 1978).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1976).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The pertinent provisions of the statute, in this regard, read as follows:
. If any person ... is found guilty of a violation ... of this section after trial
.or upon a plea of guilty, the court may, without entering a judgment of
guilty ... place him on probation.... If during the period of his probation
such person does not violate any of the conditions of the probation, then ...
the court shall discharge such person and dismiss the charges against him.
21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(I) (1976) (emphasis added).
96. See text accompanying note 86-88 supra.
97. Legislation is currently pending which adopts the alternative suggested.
Mass. H.R. 1823, 170 Gen. Court, 2nd Sess. (1978). Under a statutory enactment sim
ilar to the one proposed here, drug addicts are sent to the treatment programs only
after conviction. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-485(a), 19-498(a) (West 1977). "Conn
ecticut judges and prosecutors consider the post plea or conviction route to treatment
preferable to allowing diversion in lieu of prosecution." Note, Addict Diversion: An
Alternative Approach for the Criminal Justice System, 60 GEO. L.J. 667, 686 (1972).
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mination that the legislature is seeking other objectives than to de
ter the assertion of a constitutional right in enacting section 24E.
Notwithstanding this analysis, the LeRoy decision upheld an inter
pretation of a statutory scheme which imposed a greater penalty as
the result of the exercise of the sixth amendment right to trial by
jury and analogized the statutory scheme to plea bargaining. 98 In
so doing, the court is necessarily imputing an intent on the part of
the legislature to inhibit the exercise of a constitutional right. 99
The question becomes whether the state may constitutionally
impose harsher sentences for this purpose.
The authority cited by the LeRoy court to support its decision
reflects the judiciary's ambivalence about state practices which dis
courage the assertion of constitutional or statutory rights. On one
side of the issue, the decisions of Brady v. United States lOO and
Bordenkircher v. Hayes lOl assert that the state may impose risks of
greater punishment to dissuade a defendant from invoking constitu
tional rights. lo2 On the other side of the issue, the decisions of
North Carolina v. Pearce l03 and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe lO4 enun
ciate principles that contradict the Brady-Bordenkircher result. Yet
the LeRoy court cited each decision to uphold its interpretation of
the statutory scheme under sections 24 and 24E. Therefore, these
four decisions and the principles they represent are crucial to a
proper determination of the constitutional viability of the court's
interpretation of section 24E.
In Pearce, the United States Supreme Court delineated the
extent to which the constitution limits the imposition of harsher
sentences after conviction upon retrial. lOS The decision held that
the Equal Protection Clause does not absolutely impose a bar to a
more severe sentence upon reconviction-a proposition cited by
the LeRoy court to support its decision. 106 The Court, however,
98. See note 43 supra.
99. See text accompanying notes 111-13 infra.
100. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
101. 434 U.S. 357, rehearing denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
102. Both of these decisions refer to plea bargaining as a constitutionally legiti
mate practice while recognizing that it is often used to deter a defendant from pro
ceeding to trial by jury. 434 U.S. at 363. See 397 U.S. at 751.
103. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
104. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
105. The defendant had his original conviction set aside on appeal on the
ground that an involuntary confession had unconstitutionally been admitted in evi
dence. He was later retired and reconvicted and received a harsher sentence than the
one imposed in the original trial. 395 U.S. at 713.
106. _395 U.S. at 723. Ti!.e failure of the Pearce court to find an equal protection
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also stated, "[I]mposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having
successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal . . . would be no
less a violation of due process of law."107 Where a greater penalty
is motivated by "vindictiveness," the rights of the defendant are vi
olated. 108 "Vindictiveness" is defined by the Court as consisting of
a retaliatory motive on the part of the state to penalize those who
choose to exercise statutory or constitutional rights. 1oo If "vindic
tiveness" is present, the portion of the greater sentence attributa
ble to that motive is unconstitutional and void. 110
The Pearce directive against vindictive sentencing is over
looked by the LeRoy court. In interpreting section 24E, the court
upheld different sentencing for persons tried by a jury and persons
tried by a judge. In recognizing that the risk of a greater punish
ment may discourage the exercise of the right to trial by jury, 111
violation has not been without criticism. In referring to the decision one author
writes, "This case again reflects the Court's lack of concern for quantitative differ
ences in sentencing possibilities." Berger, Equal Protection and Criminal Sen
tencing: Legal and Policy Considerations, 71 Nw. L. REv. 29, 44-45 n.97.
The LeRoy court is incorrect in using the equal protection analysis of Pearce to
reject the equal protection challenge posed by LeRoy. Although the Pearce Court
held that equal protection does not absolutely impose a bar to a more severe sen
tence upon reconviction, the Court reached this result by reasoning that the defen
dant after reconviction may also receive a "shorter sentence ... than the one origi
nally imposed." 395 U.S. at 722. Thus, the mere possibility a more severe sentence
would result from invoking the right to appeal did not infringe on that right. Id. In
contrast, LeRoy could not receive a shorter sentence for exercising his right to trial
by jury. His license is automatically revoked. This fact distinguishes the equal pro
tection analysis of Pearce from the circumstances present in LeRoy.
107. 395 U.S. at 724. Though states are not required to establish avenues of ap
pellate review, "once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned
distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts." Id. (citing
Ribaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-11 (1966».
108. 395 U.S. at 725.
109. Id. at 723-25. To assure that a "vindictive" motive is not present where a
judge imposes a harsher sentence, the Pearce court wrote:
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a
new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those rea
sons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable con
duct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of original
sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sen
tence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional le
gitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.
Id. at 726.
110. Id.
111. The court wrote, "[Nlot all government imposed choices in the criminal
process which discourage the exercise of rights are impermissible." 1978 Mass. Adv.
Sh. at 2380, 380 N.E.2d at 130 (citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 29-35
(1973». The court cited this language in response to LeRoy's assertion that different
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the court is implicitly accepting the vindictive motive. Clearly, the
legislature had some motive in enacting section 24E. If the motive
was not to discourage the assertion of the right to trial by jury, a
statute which operates to discourage the assertion of this right cre
ates the same "needless chill" that the Jackson Court prohibited. 112
Yet the LeRoy court did not review the case in terms of Jackson.
Instead, it looked to the practice of plea bargaining where greater
sentences are often recommended to deter the defendant from pro
ceeding to trial by jury. 113 The court's analogy suggests an accept
ance of vindictive sentencing which is a practice thoroughly con
demned by the Pearce decision.
Following the proscription against "vindictive" sentencing, the
Styncombe Court considered the charge that the threat of a harsher
reconviction sentence, for whatever reason, chilled the exercise of
constitutional rights. 114 The United States Supreme Court held
that the constitution does not forbid "every government-imposed
choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging
the exercise of constitutional rights. "115 Thus, the mere "possibility
of vindictiveness" did not render the choice of whether to appeal a
conviction and seek a new trial so difficult as to unconstitutionally
infringe on that choice. 116 Nevertheless, the Court recognized that
"it would be impermissible for the sentencing authority to mete
out higher sentences on retrial as punishment for those who suc
cessfully exercise their right to appeal. . . . "117 The issue is
whether the mere possibility of "vindictiveness" in sentencing is
enough to invoke the Pearce rationale. 118 Stynchcombe, therefore,
sentencing requirements for defendants tried by a jury and defendants tried by a
judge infringed en the right to tria! by jury.
112. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
113. See notes 43 and 102 supra and accompanying text.
114. The defendant had his original conviction set aside because of an errone
ous jury instruction. On retrial, the defendant was again convicted and the jury rec
ommended a greater sentence than the one imposed in the original trial. 412 U.S. at
18-21. The defendant contended that harsher sentences on retrial are impermissible,
even if vindictiveness plays no role, because they have a "chilling effect" on the de
fendant's right to appeal his original conviction. Id. at 29.
115. Id. at 30.
116. Id. at 25-26. The Court was persuaded by the fact that the jury in the sec
ond trial was unlikely to be aware of the prior sentence and therefore consciously in
crease the sentence for the purpose of punishing the defendant for his successful ap
peal. Id.
117. Id. at 24.
118. The dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan and Mar
shall, all stress the proposition that the mere possibility of vindictiveness is enough
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did not disturb the Pearce directive against greater punishment in
retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights.
The defendant in LeRoy was not faced with the mere possibil
ity of "vindictiveness" but with the certainty of "vindictiveness,"
because the "vindictiveness" is institutionalized in the statutory
scheme. The only distinction between those defendants tried by a
judge who are eligible for section 24E disposition and those de
fendants tried by a jury who are ineligible for section 24E disposi
tion is the assertion of the sixth amendment. Consequently, the
risk of a more severe punishment is necessarily greater for defend
ants who proceed to trial by jury. The LeRoy court missed this vi
tal distinction and instead focused on the general proposition that
the possibility of a harsher sentence did not burden the right to
trial by jury.
Both Pearce and Stynchcombe relied upon principles promul
gated in Jackson in formulating the sanction against "vindictive"
sentencing. There the Court stated that imposition of punishment
"penalizing those who choose to exercise [constitutional rights] ...
would be patently unconstitutional."119 Nevertheless, subsequent
cases have limited the reach of this principle. In Brady, the United
States Supreme Court adopted the proposition that a guilty plea is
not invalid because it was motivated by a desire to accept the
probability or certainty of a lesser penalty.120 The Court, however,
qualified this language by writing, "We here make no reference to
the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both, deliberately
employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular
defendant to tender a plea of guilty. "121 It seems, therefore, that
Brady did not fully abrogate the prohibition against "vindictive"
sentencing. 122
The Pearce preclusion of "vindictive" sentencing is severely
undermined in Bordenkircher. Here, the United States Supreme
Court sustained the conviction of a defendant who pleaded guilty
after the state prosecutor threatened to reindict the defendant on
more serious charges if he proceeded to trial on the original
to "chill" the exercise of a constitutional right rendering the statutory scheme
unconstitutional. [d. at 35-46.
119. 390 U.S. at 581.
120. 397 U.S. at 751. But see United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). See
also Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 799 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. 397 U.S. at 751 n.8.
122. The dissenting opinion of Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall point
ed out that the majority opinion undermines the rationale on which Jackson was de
cided. 412 U.S. at 35-46.
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charges. 123 Though a vindictive motive was clearly established, the
Court nonetheless wrote that "by tolerating and encouraging the
negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as consti
tutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's interest
at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his
right not to plead guilty."124 Jackson, Pearce, and Stynchcombe
were distinguished on the basis that "in the 'give and take' of plea
bargaining, there is no . . . element of punishment or retaliation so
long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's of
fer."125 The four dissenting Justices pointed out that Jackson and
Pearce are clear in their directive that "if the only objective of a
state practice is to discourage the assertion of a constitutional right
it is 'patently unconstitutional.' "126
As indicated, there are competing lines of authority about
whether it is constitutional to implement harsher penalties to dis
courage a defendant from asserting constitutional rights. Brady and
Bordenkircher allow state action to inhibit the assertion of the right
to trial by jury in the context of plea bargaining. Jackson and
Pearce prohibit any state action intended to impose a greater pen
alty in retaliation for the assertion of a constitutional right. Of the
two positions, the LeRoy court aligns itself with the former. The
wisdom of this alignment is unclear. 127
123. Under the circumstances of this case, there is no question of "vindictive
ness." The prosecutor admitted that his sole reason for telling the defendant that he
would indict the defendant on more serious charges if the defendant did not plead
guilty was to deter the defendant from exercising his right to trial by jury. 434 U.S. at
361 n.7.
124. 434 U.S. at 364.
125. Id. at 363.
126. Id. at 372 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Pearce decision broadens the lan
guage of Jackson by invalidating that part of the increased sentence represented by
the "vindictive" motive. The state may not avoid the rule in Jackson by asserting
that vindictiveness is not its sole purpose. If the state action "chills" the exercise of
a constitutional right and this is the intended effect then the state cannot immunize
itself by claiming it had other legitimate purposes as well. Were such an argument
accepted, Jackson and Pearce would be meaningless.
127. From the standpoint of fairness and constitutional principle, state action to
discourage the exercise of the sixth amendment right to trial by jury has considerable
ramifications. For an extensive analysis of the fundamental nature of the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Where a defendant is persuaded not to proceed to trial by jury certain conse
quences follow which bypass elementary constitutional safeguards. A plea of guilty
constitutes a waiver of not only the right to trial by jury but also the right to remain
silent, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); to present one's witnesses in one's de
fense, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); to confront one's accusers, Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); and to be convicted of proof beyond all reasonable
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The LeRoy court upheld its interpretation of sections 24 and
24E because the court considered the statutory scheme to be simi
lar to plea bargaining. Yet the court's analogy is misplaced. First,
under plea bargaining, the defendant is faced with the possibility of
a more severe sentence on conviction by a jury since the prosecu
tor can merely recommend the sentence to be imposed. Contra
rily, under the statutory scheme, the defendant will certainly face a
more severe sentence upon conviction by a jury because the judge's
only alternative is to revoke his license. Second, under plea bar
gaining, the prosecutor is the agent by which the plea is induced
whereas under the statutory scheme the statute itself is the agent
by which the plea is induced. The prosecutor need not offer any
concession to the defendant to induce his plea and the "give and
doubt. By tolerating the practice of plea bargaining, values of administrative conven
ience and efficiency take precedence over fundamental constitutional values, yet the
Constitution makes no provision that considerations of administration are to assume
such a dominant role. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1405 (1970). Furthermore, the responsibility of the prosecutor
does not require that he be satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 151 (1970). And finally, the encouragement of repentance through threat
of greater punishment for refusal to do so undermines not only the sincerity of that
contrition but weakens the popular notion of innocence until proven guilty.
An excellent survey of the constitutional arguments in opposition to plea bar
gaining is found in Judge Levin's concurring opinion in People v. Byrd, 12 Mich.
App. 186, 194, 162 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1968).
The justification for state action -designed to discourage trial by jury rests largely
on the need for judicial economy. Current prosecutorial and judicial resources are in
adequate to support the system if jury trial were the primary mode of adjudication.
Approximately ninety percent of all federal and state convictions are obtained by
way of gUilty pleas. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966). See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261
(1971). The expeditious disposition of criminal charges serves to lessen the period of
pre-trial confinement, protect the public from those offenders who are likely to con
tinue their criminal activity until incarcerated, and enhance the effectiveness of
rehabilitative and deterrence value of imprisonment. Id. The practice may also result
in an optimum sentence from the perspective of both defense counsel and the prose
cutor. Nagel & Neef, The Impact of Plea Bargaining on the Judicial Process, 62
A.B.A.J. 1020 (1976).
Concomitant with the judicial economy argument, two other justifications for
plea bargaining are often suggested. First, given the procedural safeguards accompa
nying a trial and the high standard of proof, the potential that some guilty persons
will be acquited is high. See Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1031-41 (1975). Second, participation by the defendant in determining
the nature and degree of his punishment with some certainty alleviates apprehension
and may further legitimize the process under which his freedom is restrained. See
Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 564, 576 (1977).
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take" of plea negotiations is absent. 128 In short, plea bargaining
presupposes that the ultimate sentence the defendant is to receive
is negotiable. The penalty under section 24, as interpreted by the
court, however, is not negotiable. If the defendant is convicted by
a jury then his license is revoked. To the extent that plea bar
gaining has become institutionalized, this statutory framework and
its judicial construction gives the practice the imprimatur of legisla
tive enactment. 129
The differences between plea bargaining and the statutory
scheme create additional pressure to foresake a trial by jury for
those defendants charged with driving while intoxicated. As
pointed out, under plea bargaining, the defendant is always faced
with the possibility, however remote it may be, that the court will
not follow the recommendations of the prosecutor. By contrast, the
court has no such option with respect to the license revocation pro
vision in view of the LeRoy court's construction of sections 24 and
24E. Since most defendants regard the license revocation provision
as the most severe of all possible sentences for the offense except.
for actual incarceration,130 the risk associated with a jury conviction
will serve undoubtedly to dissuade a defendant from insisting on a
trial by jury. 131
If the statutory scheme is not analogous to plea bargaining and
if defendants forego their right to trial by jury through fear of a
128. It is the "give and take" of plea negotiations that the Hordenkircher court
used to distinguish the fact of that case from the decision in Jackson. 434 U.S. at 363.
See text accompanying note 125 supra.
129. Because the legislation, as interpreted by the court, imposes a greater sen
tence for those persons tried by a jury, the defendant has no orie with which to bar~
gain. The legislature has established different treatment for two classes of persons
based on the invocation of a constitutionai right. The defendant maintained that
there is .no rational basis for affording section 24E disposition to one group, those
persons who are tried before a judge, and denying this alternative disposition to an
other group, those persons who are tried by a jury. Brief for the Appellant at 11,
Commonwealth v. LeRoy, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2376, 380 N.E.2d 128. The court re
sponded by stating "[t)here is no constitutional equal protection right that such a
method of disposition be available to alL" Id. at 2379, 380 N.E.2d at 130. However,
it avoids the issue to say that alternative disposition under section 24E is not consti
tutionally mandated. While the legislature may not be required to provide defen
dants with a certain benefit or privilege, it may not grant that benefit on conditions
requiring the defendant to relinquish a constitutional right. See Comment, Aoother
Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968).
130. Little, A Theory and Empirical Study of What Deters Drinking Drivers,
If, When and Why, 23 AD. L. REv. 23, 51 (1971). See also Little, Administration of
Justice in Drunk Driving Cases, 58 A.B.A.J. 950, 952 (1972).
131. See note 19 supra.
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greater penalty, Jackson and Pearce suggest a due process viola
tion. Such a violation is also apparent under the Stynchcombe ra
tionale because the "vindictiveness" is not a mere possibility but a
certainty. In other words, under the LeRoy court's interpretation of
the statutes, the legislature has mandated that a greater penalty be
imposed on those persons who are convicted by a jury than those
persons who either admit to the charge or accept a jury-waived ad
judication. If this result was intended, then Pearce and Stynch
ombe condemn it. If this result was unintended, then Jackson re
quires alternatives. In either case, an infringement of an elemen
tary constitutional right is realized.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The LeRoy court was clearly unreceptive to the defendant's al
legations of unfairness and unconstitutionality of the judicial con
struction of sections 24 and 24E even though there exists both au
thority and reasoning in support of his position. This reluctance to
delve into the issues raised by LeRoy is explained partially by the
court's perception of the nature of the crime. Traditionally, the
person arrested for drunk driving, though not convicted, has been
afforded less constitutional protection than more culpable offend
ers.132 In addition, the judiciary has shown its disapproval of con
stitutional challenges to sentencing classifications. 133 The underly
ing reason fur the LeRoy decision, however, is the judicial acqui
escence in an administrative procedure which makes the
consequences of a jury verdict far less palatable than either the ad
mission of guilt or the waiver of trial by jury. For the sake of
administrative convenience, basic constitutional safeguards are rele
gated to secondary status.
The LeRoy decision is but one example of the judicial insen
sitivity to a defendant's call for unfettered access to fundamental
constitutional guarantees. The impact of the decision is important
not only for its lack of insight but also for its effect on popular per
ceptions of the criminal justice system. If a typical citizen is to be
come involved in this system, chances are that it will be in connec
tion with a motor vehicle offense. As one author notes, "The way
justice is dispensed in these cases will have much to do with
shaping general conceptions of what the system of justice in this
132. See Erwin, There is no Danger of a Fair Trial in a Drunk Driving Case,
51 CAL. ST. B. J. 214 (1976).
133. See Berger, supra note 106, at 46.
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country is really like. "134 Most people who are arrested for drunk
driving feel that the incident will cause them to lose the respect of
family and friends, and also will damage their reputation at
work. 135 The law should not inhibit the opportunity for these peo
ple to fully vindicate themselves for the purpose of administrative
convenience.
Richard D. Haley, Jr.
134. Little, An Empirical Description of the Administration of Justice in
Drunk Driving Cases, 7 L. SOC'Y REv. 473,474 (1972).
135. Little, supra note 130, at 49.

